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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
GAYLE KEITH WESLING aka SESLING 
aka WES SESLING, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NO. 43126 
 
          Ada County Case No.  
          CR-2014-9031 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Wesling failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his concurrent unified sentences of 14 years 
with two years fixed, for grand theft, and five years, with two years fixed, for criminal 
possession of a financial transaction card? 
 
 
Wesling Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Wesling pled guilty to grand theft and to criminal possession of a financial 
transaction card, and the district court imposed unified sentences of 14 years, with two 
years fixed, for grand theft, and five years, with two years fixed, for criminal possession 
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of a financial transaction card.  (R., pp.62-66.)  The district court ordered that Wesling’s 
sentences in this case run concurrently with each other but consecutively to his 
sentence in Ada County Case number CR-2014-6459.  (R., pp.63-64.)  Wesling filed a 
timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied.  
(R., pp.70, 80-85.)  Wesling filed a notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s 
order denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.86-88.)   
Wesling asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion for reduction of his sentences because he was unable to immediately be 
placed at the work center due to his classification as a medium risk by the Idaho 
Department of Correction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  Wesling has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion.   
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho 
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a 
sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35 
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id. 
 Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence 
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district 
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, 
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review 
the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 
442 (2008).   
Wesling did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case.  On appeal, he 
merely argues that the district court should have reduced his sentences pursuant to his 
 3 
Rule 35 motion because he was unable to be immediately placed at the work center 
due to his classification as a medium risk by the Idaho Department of Correction. 
 (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  Although Wesling claims that the district court was 
“attempting to mitigate” the accrual of “significant interest before he is able to start 
paying restitution” (Appellant’s brief, p.6), at no point did the district court indicate that 
its intention was to prevent Wesling from accruing interest on the $9,424.26 he was 
ordered to pay in restitution (see Tr., p.30, L.11 – p.38, L.4).  Rather, the district court 
noted that “by the time you even are able to start paying restitution, with the interest 
alone we’re probably talking about an 18,000 to $20,000 bill, which will increase every 
year” (Tr., p.34, L.24 – p.35, L.2), and explained: 
I’m going to run this sentence consecutive to Judge Hippler’s 
sentence, and the reason for that is, one, to ensure that [Wesling is] under 
supervision for some period of time; and, two, to ensure that he has plenty 
of time to get this restitution paid and that’s why.  And I do recognize the 
impact of a consecutive sentence. 
 
(Tr., p.35, Ls.5-11).  In its order denying Wesling’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence, the district court stated, “It is not new information to observe that an inmate 
may not be immediately eligible for the work center or that the sentence impacts his 
eligibility for specific programs.  The Court was and is aware its sentence impacts 
Department of Correction programming decisions.”  (R., p.81, n.1.)  Because Wesling 
presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in 
the motion that his sentences were excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, 
he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his 
Rule 35 motion.   
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Even if this Court addresses the merits of Wesling’s claim, Wesling has still failed 
to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s 
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  
(Appendix A.)   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Wesling’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences. 
       
 DATED this 1st day of December, 2015. 
 
 
 
      _/s/_____________________________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of December, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic 
copy to: 
 
REED P. ANDERSON  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/____________________________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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On Novcmbet· 13, 2014, the Court sentenced Gayle Keith Westing on Count I. Grand Theft, 
Felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b), -2109, to an aggregate tenn of fourteen (14) years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of 
custody not to exceed twelve (12) years. The Cou11 sentenced him on Count II. Criminal Possession 
of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, I.C. §§ 18-3125, -3128, to an aggregate tenn of five (5) 
years, with a minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent 
indetenninate period of custody not to exceed three (3) years. The Court ordered both counts to run 
concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence in Case No. CR-FE-2014-6459. The 
Court further recommended he be placed in the Community Work Center. 
Wesling did not appeal the Court's sentence. 
Westing's counsel, T .ance Fuisting, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35, !.C.R., on March 2, 2015. 
Westing requests a hearing and the Court denies his request. !.C.R. 35 provides in part, as 
follows: " ... Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule ... shall be considered and 
determined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and without oral argument, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion; .... " 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
CASE NO. CR-J<'E-2014-0009031 
000080 
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Westing presented no new infonnation but requests the Court reduce hjs senlem.:e or run his 
sentence concurrent with his other case. He simply reargues his sentence. The burden is on a 
defendant to prove a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214, 219 
(1999). Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration MUST be supported by new or additional 
infonnation.1 It is not appropriate to simply reargue the sentence. That is not the purpose of a motion 
for reconsideration. 
A motion for reduction ofa sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, 
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Copenhaver, 129 Idaho 494, 
496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996); State v. Buok, 127 Idaho 352, 355, 900 P.2d 1363, 
1366 (1995); State v. Knighton, 143 Tdaho 118,319, 144 P.Jd 23, 24 (2006); Stale v. 
Allbee, 115 fdaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct.App.1989). Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant presenting a Rule 3S 
motion must submit new 01· additional informntion In support of the motion, and 
an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion "cannot be used as a vehicle to 
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new evidence." 
Htiffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. Accordingly, because Shumway 
presented no new or additional evidence in support of his motion, we will not review 
the reasonableness of the sontonce nor disturb tho district court's ordo1· denyin~ 
the motion. 
State v. Shumway, 144 Idaho 580, 583, 165 P.3d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). The 
Idaho Supreme Court has made this clear. 
However, Rule 35 does !!fil function as an appeal of a sentence. Instead, it is a 
narrow rule allowing a trial court to correct on illegal sentence (at any time) or to 
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner (within 120 days) ... . When 
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the dcfemhmt must show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
distl'ict court in support of the Rule 35 motion. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320, 144 
P.3d at 25; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003); State v. 
Strand. 137 Idaho 457, 463, 50 P.3d 472, 478 (2002); see also State v. Wright, 134 
Idaho 73, 79, 996 P.2d 292, 298 (2000). An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information .... 
State v. lll{/Jman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)(emphasis added). 
24 1 It Is not new infomiation to observe that an inmate may not be immediately eligible for lhe work center or that the 
sentence impacts his eligibility for specific programs. The Court was and is aware its sentence impacts DepRrtment of 
25 Correction programming decisions. 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 3S MOTION 
CASE NO. CR-FE-2014-0009031 2 
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As further discussed below, Wesling has not presented any infonnation to support his request 
and hls request is denied. 
ANALYSIS 
Wesling requests leniency and a reduction in his sentences. The Court rejects his request. 
Rule 35, !.C.R., provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(M)otions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days 
of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction 
and shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of 
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court 
in its discretion; .... 
The determination of whether to grant the relief requested by Wesling is a matter committed to the 
Court's discretion and the Court's decision is governed by the same standnl'd as the original sentence. 
See State v. Gardiner, 127 Idaho 156, 164, 989 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995); Stale v. Ricks, 120 Idaho 
875 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In this review, this Court has employed the standards set fo11h in State v. 
Toohill, I 03 Idaho 565, 650 P .2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Court m1rJe1·s(oorJ (hat this w<1s a matter of discretion and considered several factors both 
in the original sentencing and in deciding this Motion For Reconsideration. A sentence has several 
objectives: (1) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) 
possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment for wrongdoing. The primary consideration is, and 
should he, "the good order imcl protection of society." Stale v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 
(Ct. App. 1982). 
In any sentt:ncing, lhe primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In this 
case, Wesling pied guilty to Count I. Grand Theft, Felony, J.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(1)(b), -2409 
and Count II. Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, I.C. §§ 18·3125, -3128. 
The Court imposed an aggregate term of fourteen ( 14) years, with a minimum period of confinement 
of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indetenninate period of cuMody not to exceed twelve ( 12) 
years on Count I. The Court sentenced him on Count II to an aggregate tenn of five (5) years, with a 
minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequenl indeterminate period of 
custody not to exceed three (3) years .. The maximum penalty for Grand Theft is fourteen ( 14) years 
and for Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card is five (5) years. 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
CASE NO. CR-FE-2014-0009031 3 
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The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the 
tcnn of confinement for sentence review purposes. State v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675, 
676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a two-year (2) fixed sentence for Grand Theft and for 
Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card is lenient considering the facts of these crimes 
and is well within the statutory sentence guiclelines. Furthennore, the Court consiclered the entirety of 
the sentence, including any indetenninate time, and found it necessary to ensure Wesling, as a career 
criminal with a lot of restitution owed, would be supervised and have the opportunity to repay his 
victims. 
The Court further finds imposing this case consecutively to a previous case was necessa1y. A 
sentencing judge is authorized to impose a sentence to run consecutively to a sentence which has 
previously been imposed. State v. Ricks, 120 Idaho 875,878, 820 P.2d 1232, 1233 (Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 400-01, 565 P.2d 989, 990-91 (1977); State v. Lloyd, 104 Idaho 
397, 401, 659 P.2d 151, 155 (Ct. App. 1983). The decision whether a sentence is to run 
consecutively or concurrently with another sentence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 
court. State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125,126,609 P.2d 657,659 (1980); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 
341,346,715 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Ct. App. 986). 
In arriving at this sentence, the Court considered Wesling's character and any mitigating or 
aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this case -
suggt:sting tht: m:t:d for this sentence. In particular, the Court's decision focused on rehabilitation, 
retribution, and protection of society. The facts of these crimes and his criminal history suggested the 
need for this sentence in order to properly rehabilitate hint 
This was his seventh 11nu eighth lifetime felony conviction D.U.I. (I 992, 2002, 2002, 20022, 
2014 ), and Deli very of c Controlled Substance ( 1995). He has numerous misdemeanor convictions as 
well including D.U.I. (1988, 1988, 1990), Battery (1992), Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(2013), and probation violations and failures to appear. 
The Court found that this sentence would promote rehabilitation; there is a need for some 
punishment that fits the crime before real rehabilitation will be effective. The Cou11 finds that this 
2 The State dismissed a 2003 D.U.I. as well. 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 3S MOTION 
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sentence fulfill~ the ohjcetivcs of protecting society and achieves dete1Tence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution, and therefore denies Westing's Motion for Reconsideration. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 9th day of March 2015. 
26 ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
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